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Abstract—There is considerable amount of sensitive XML data 
stored in relational databases. It is a challenge to enforce node level 
fine-grained authorization policies for XML data stored in relational 
databases which typically support table and column level access 
control. Moreover, it is common to have conflicting authorization 
policies over the hierarchical nested structure of XML data. There 
are a couple of XML access control models for relational XML 
databases proposed in the literature. However, to our best 
knowledge, none of them discussed handling authorization conflicts 
with conditions in the domain of relational XML databases. 
Therefore, we believe that there is a need to define and incorporate 
effective fine-grained XML authorization models with conflict 
handling mechanisms in the presence of conditions into relational 
XML databases. We address this issue in this study.  
Keywords—XML; RDBMS; Relational; Access Control; 
Authorization; Conflict Resolution; Security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
XML documents over the Web and across corporate networks 
include critical governmental, financial, medical and scientific 
information with sensitive data. It is crucial to protect the 
sensitive data from the access of unauthorized users. 
Enforcing access restrictions on XML data has become 
critical in order to have efficient mechanisms to securely store 
and query XML. 
In general, access restriction mechanisms are defined by a set 
of authorization policies which typically grant or deny access 
to objects of a data set for specific users. An authorization 
policy set is likely to include conflicting policies such as grant 
and deny, grant and partial deny (conditional deny), partial 
grant (conditional grant) and partial deny, defined on the 
same object. These authorization conflicts need to be 
recognized and handled effectively in a secure and reliable 
access restriction mechanism. 
Several researchers have proposed to use the mature relational 
database technology to store, secure and query XML data [1, 
5, 6, 11, 12]. Although relational databases support table level 
and tuple level access control mechanism, they do not provide 
node-level restriction mechanisms for the hierarchical XML 
data. Moreover, a relational XML storage needs to be 
equipped with a fine-grained conflict resolution support. 
We propose a rule-based access control model for relational 
XML databases in this paper. In the proposed access control 
model, XML authorization rules are converted into relational 
tuples to be stored in a relational table. Overall security check 
is conducted inside the relational database. The authorization 
conflicts are dealt with effectively using a centralized 
authorization table in the database.  
The main contributions of this paper include the followings: 
i. We augment our test bed relational XML Database 
(XML2REL) [1] with an access control model which 
enables document authors to define and enforce 
XML authorization rules which include conflicting 
grant and deny privileges over XML elements and 
subtrees stored in a relational database. The 
XAR2RAR algorithm proposed in this paper takes 
an XML authorization document and translates it 
into a relational authorization table to be used in 
secure query processing. 
ii. We define the concepts of absolute conflicts and 
partial conflicts to deal with conflicting 
authorization policies in a fine-grained access 
control model. 
II. MOTIVATION 
The authorization conflicts occur in various cases. The 
conflicts in defining authorization policies may arise due to 
different reasons. If the authorization policies are not issued 
by a central division in an enterprise, it is likely to have 
redundant or conflicting policies proposed by different 
departments. Even if the authorization policies are issued by a 
central authority, these policies will not be static. Existing 
policies may need to be modified as the business rules change 
or the enterprise evolves. Hence, the existing security rules 
and the newly proposed rules may cause authorization 
conflicts. In either case, those conflicts need to be resolved 
correctly and properly. 
A fine-grained access control model: 
i. should allow authorized users to access every single 
part of the data set that they are permitted. 
ii. should prevent authorized users from accessing any 
part of the data set that they are not permitted. 
In a fine grained access control model, an effective and 
correct conflict resolution varies from case to case. Therefore, 
identifying various conflicting situations and dealing with 
them accordingly is a challenging important task in a fine-
grained access control model. The following list includes 
examples of various conflicting authorization cases based on 
the security rules defined for accessing student GPA’s (Grade 
Point Average) in an educational domain: 
1. When having grant and deny authorizations on the 
same object with only grant having a condition such 
as "staff is granted access to GPA > 2.0" and "staff is 
denied access to GPA".   
2. When having grant and deny authorizations on the 
same object with only deny having a condition such 
as "staff is granted access to GPA" and "staff is 
denied access to GPA < 2.0".  
3. When having grant and deny authorizations on the 
same object with both having conditions and the 
condition of grant is the subset of the condition of 
deny such as "staff is granted access to GPA > 3.0" 
and "staff is denied access to GPA > 2.0".  
4. When having grant and deny authorizations on the 
same object with both having conditions and the 
condition of deny is the subset of the condition of 
grant such as "staff is granted access to GPA < 3.0" 
and "staff is denied access to GPA < 2.0".  
A fine-grained access control model deals with each one of 
the various conflict cases differently. For example, while our 
proposed fine-grained access control model eliminates the 
grant rule in the first case, in the second case, it does not 
eliminate but revise the grant rule with the reverse of the deny 
condition as follows: "staff is granted access to GPA >= 2.0".  
In case #4, grant rule is not eliminated but revised with the 
difference of ranges of grant and deny conditions as follows: 
"staff is granted access to 2.0 <= GPA < 3.0" 
Each case needs to be handled properly and differently so that 
the access control system is ensured to generate and retain 
fine-grained authorization policies which is a challenging 
task.  We believe that there is need to define and incorporate 
fine-grained XML authorization models with effective 
conflict handling mechanisms in the presence of conditional 
security policies into relational XML databases. We address 
this issue in this study. 
III. RELATED WORK 
Although a number of access control models were proposed 
for native XML databases in the literature [2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
14], there are lesser access control models proposed by 
researchers for relational XML databases [5, 6, 8, 11, 12]. In 
[5, 6], authors proposed schema-oblivious XML access 
control techniques using relational databases. In [11, 12], 
authors proposed schema-based XML access control 
approaches for relational databases. However, handling 
authorization conflicts in the presence of conditions is not 
elaborated in these studies. 
The authorization policies in XML security models are mainly 
defined either as external subset or internal subset [5]. In 
external subset approach, the policies are defined in an 
external file based on the content and structure of the 
underlying XML document which is denoted by a DTD or 
XML Schema. Internal subset approach defines and inlines 
additional tags within the target XML document to 
incorporate the security information. Internal subset overrides 
the external subset if they occur together. We choose external 
subset approach in our study. 
Various conflict resolution policies proposed in the literature 
solve conflicts with general policies such as “denials take 
precedence or deny overrides” [3, 8]. However, these policies 
do not consider the cases when the subject is conditionally 
denied accessing part of the object that was previously 
granted access. We propose a fine-grained access control 
model for relational XML databases which address all aspects 
of handling authorization conflicts including conditional ones 
in this paper. 
IV. PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION MODEL 
 
In this section, we propose a fine-grained authorization model 
for relational XML databases. We adopted our previously 
defined deny-only access control model [11] and enhanced it 
with the inclusion of grant rules along with deny rules and 
conflict resolution policies. We also changed the default 
semantics from grant to deny in this enhanced authorization 
model. 
In our authorization model, an access control policy contains 
a set of authorization rules. In this access control model, an 
authorization rule is a tuple of the form (subject, object, 
condition, action, type, mode) where 
 subject denotes to a group of users 
 object refers to the group of data that the subject is 
concerned with 
 condition denotes the optional predicate applied to 
the object  
 action refers to the type of action (select, update, 
delete, etc.) that the subject is denied or allowed  
 type indicates whether the rule affects only the object 
or propagates to the descendants of the object 
 mode indicates whether the action is grant or deny 
In our enhanced access control model, we consider both grant 
and deny rules. We introduced the mode parameter to enable 
defining opposite authorization rules with grant and deny 
modes unlike our previous model where only deny rules are 
allowed. We introduce conditional authorization rules with 
the use of condition parameter in authorization rules. 
Therefore, various authorization conflicts may frequently 
occur in the proposed access control model.  
We only consider select action for simplicity in this paper. 
The default semantic of the proposed access control model is 
deny. Therefore, no one can access any part of the XML 
document unless there is a rule which allows a user to access 
a specific part, element or attribute of the XML document.  
Authorization conflicts occur if two authorization rules with 
opposite operation modes, namely grant and deny, are defined 
on the same object. We categorize authorization conflicts as 
absolute conflicts and partial conflicts and deal with them 
accordingly. We introduce the notions of absolute conflicts 
and partial conflicts in the following definitions. 
Definition 4.1 (Absolute Authorization Conflict). An 
authorization rule can be denoted as Rulesbj(Obj[predicate]) 
where Rule indicates Grant or Deny, sbj is the subject of the 
Rule, Obj is the object concerned by the Rule and predicate is 
the condition defined for the Rule. If the rules 
Grants(O[predicateg]) and Denys(O[predicated]) are given 
for the same subject S, object O and if predicateg  
predicated, then, Absolute Conflict is said to occur between 
these rules. 
Definition 4.2 (Partial Authorization Conflict). An 
authorization rule can be denoted as Rulesbj(Obj[predicate]) 
where Rule indicates Grant or Deny, sbj is the subject of the 
Rule, Obj is the object concerned by the Rule and predicate is 
the condition defined for the Rule. If the rules 
Grants(O[predicateg]) and Denys(O[predicated]) are given 
for the same subject S, object O and if one of the following 
conditions holds:     i) predicated  predicateg,  ii) predicated 
 predicateg ≠ AND predicategpredicated≠ AND 
predicatedpredicateg≠ then, Partial Conflict is said to 
occur between these rules. 
Our general conflict resolution policy is “the latter rule 
overrides” in the presence of absolute conflicts. In addition, 
we fine-tune our conflict resolution policy with the 
consideration of partial conflicts which occur due to the 
predicates. If a deny rule conflicts with a grant rule and if at 
least one of them is defined with a predicate, our algorithm 
analyzes the predicate(s) and partially override the former 
rule if there exists a partial conflict. Therefore, in the case of 
partial conflicts, conflict resolution policy becomes “the 
latter rule partially overrides”. 
We consider simple XPath predicates to test target text nodes 
or attributes within XPath expressions of the rule tuples. We 
do not consider twig pattern matching and predicates incurred 
by twig pattern matching in this study. We use a subset of 
XPath axes, namely child, descendant and attribute axes, to 
identify the objects in a rule tuple. 
The propagation of an authorization rule to the descendants of 
the XML object node is not enforced automatically. The type 
parameter in a rule tuple determines the scope of an 
authorization rule. While a local rule only affects the object 
node itself, a recursive rule is applied to the object node as 
well as the descendants of the object node.  
A sample XML authorization rule is shown in Figure 1. The 
condition parameter of a rule tuple is combined with the 
XPath expression of the object parameter. The rule tuple 
(staff, //zip, [.>48000], select, L, grant) indicates that any zip 
element which is greater than 48000 regardless of its 
ancestors is granted select access for staff. The type L denotes 
that this rule is local and does not affect the descendants of 
zip node if there is any descendant node. 
<rule> 
  <subject>staff</subject> 
  <object>//zip[.>48000]</object> 
  <action>select</action> 
  <type>L</type> 
  <mode>grant</mode> 
</rule> 
Figure 1. Sample authorization policy rule 
V. XML-TO-RELATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
CONVERSION 
The Security Policy Conversion module translates policy 
rules and users’ information from XML to relational tables. 
The XML document for users information may include 
userID, password, first and last name and role of each user. It 
is straightforward to translate XML subtrees of users’ 
information to relational rows in a table.  
XML policy subtrees are mapped into relational tuples to be 
stored in XML Authorization Table (XAT) in the target 
relational database. The XAT table is the central place of 
authorization control in the proposed access control model. 
The XAT table stores only the grant rules since the default 
semantic of the proposed access control model is deny. Thus, 
when a query is given against the underlying database, the 
security system allows the query if there is a policy rule in the 
XAT table granting the user to execute the requested query 
against the specified object. Deny policy rules are not stored 
in the XAT table but dealt with accordingly. 
During the mapping process of XML Authorization Rules 
(XAR) to Relational Authorization Rules (RAR), if the mode 
parameter of the XML authorization rule is grant, then a 
relational rule tuple is inserted into the XAT table. A 
relational authorization rule (RAR) is deleted from the XAT 
table if there is a corresponding XAR rule denoted with deny 
mode in the XML authorization document which causes an 
absolute conflict. If an XAR deny rule partially conflicts with 
a RAR grant rule in the XAT table, then, the RAR rule is 
updated with a relevant predicate. 
We do not map mode and type parameters of an XAR rule to 
a RAR rule tuple. The mode parameter is not mapped since all 
the RAR rules in XAT table are grant rules. The type 
parameter is not mapped to a RAR rule tuple since all RAR 
rules in XAT table are local as the recursive rules are 
expanded to local ones during the mapping process.   
It is a challenge to translate an XML policy subtree to one or 
more relational tuples in XML Authorization Table (XAT). 
While it is straightforward to map subject and action 
parameters of an XML policy rule to relational columns in the 
XAT table, there are several issues included in translating an 
object parameter along with its condition parameter to its 
relational equivalents. The issues involved in translating 
object parameters of XAR rules to RAR rules are elaborated 
in [11]. These issues are primarily due to the ‘//’ axis, 
recursive scope of the policy and manipulation of the 
conditions. Conditions can get complex with multiple logical 
operators. In addition, conditions can be introduced to other 
nodes besides the context node which increases the 
complexity of mapping. 
Figure 2. XAR2RAR Algorithm 
We only consider simple conditions for the context node of a 
path expression for an object.  The condition parameter plays 
an important role in detecting various conflicts. There are 
several issues involved in manipulating condition parameters 
(predicates) during the XAR-to-RAR mapping process. These 
issues include the followings: 
 If the operation mode for the XAR rule is grant, 
condition should be extracted and inserted into the 
XAT table along with other XAR parameters 
 If the operation mode for the XAR rule is deny, the 
type of conflict should be detected analyzing the 
condition parameters of both XAR deny rule and the 
corresponding RAR grant rule 
 If there is a partial conflict then a modified condition 
(new Predicate) needs to be calculated to update the 
existing RAR rule tuple  
We propose XAR2RAR algorithm to convert XML access 
control rules (XAR) into relational access control rules (RAR) 
as well as to deal with authorization conflicts. This algorithm 
detects and resolves authorization conflicts as it translates the 
XAR rules in the input Authorization.xml document into the 
RAR rules in the output XML Authorization Table (XAT). 
The RAR rules in the XAT table are used to enforce the 
access control policies for XML data stored in a RDBMS. 
XAR2RAR algorithm is given in Figure 2. 
XAR2RAR algorithm processes each XAR rules defined in 
Authorization.xml within a loop. Firstly, it checks for the type 
parameter. The authorization rule is applied at the node level 
when type is local (L). When type is recursive (R), then the 
rule is applied at the node level as well as at the subtree 
rooted at that node. If the path expression of the Object has 
descendant axes then the XAR2RAR algorithm creates an 
ObjectPattern to find the set of all matching paths for that 
Object. This set of matching paths is called ObjectSet and 
obtained from a global path table (AllPaths) which includes 
all existing paths in a given XML document. We adapt the 
idea of introducing a global path table to our mapping scheme 
from XRel approach [13]. If the type is recursive, XAR2RAR 
algorithm places a path expression for the Object as well as 
the path expressions for all the descendants of the Object into 
the ObjectSet. Each path expression in the ObjectSet is 
processed as follows: 
 If the mode of the XAR rule is grant then a RAR 
rule tuple is inserted into the XAT table (lines 16 
and 35) 
 If the mode of the XAR rule is deny and the rule 
causes an absolute conflict then the conflicting RAR 
rule tuple is deleted from the XAT table (lines 19 
and 38) 
 If the mode of the XAR rule is deny and the rule 
causes a partial conflict then the conflicting RAR 
rule tuple is updated in the XAT table (lines 21 and 
41) 
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY 
We illustrate the proposed authorization model with a case 
study in this section. The department benchmark data set is 
used as our sample data set in the case study. The department 
data set’s schema (DTD) is shown in Figure 3. 
00 Algorithm XAR2RAR 
01 Input: XAR_Rules Authorization.xml 
02 Output: RAR_Rules XAT 
03 Begin 
04 For each Rulei in Authorization.xml 
05   Predicate, newPredicate = null; 
06   If (Object contains Predicate) then Predicate=Object.Predicate End If 
07   If (Type=’L’) then 
08       If (Object contains ‘//’) then 
09         ObjectPattern = Object.replace (“//”, “%/”) 
10         ObjectSet = “Select path From AllPaths Where path like $ObjectPattern” 
11       Else 
12  ObjectSet = Object 
13       End If 
14       For each objecti in objectSet 
15             If @Mode=’Grant’ then 
16  Insert into XAT (Subject, objecti, Predicate, Action) 
17             Else  /* Mode = ‘Deny’ */ 
18             If there exists absolute conflict then 
19   Delete From XAT Where (XAT.Subject=Subject AND XAT.Object=objectiAND 
XAT.Action=Action) 
20             Else If there exists partial conflict then 
21        Update XAT Set XAT.Predicate=newPredicate Where (XAT.Subject=Subject 
AND XAT.Object=objecti AND XAT.Action=Action) 
22                    End If 
23               End If 
24              End If 
25       End For 
26    Else  /* Type = ‘R’  */  
27        If (Object contains ‘//’) then 
28         ObjectPattern = Object.replace (“//”, “%/”) 
29         ObjectSet = “Select Path From AllPaths  
                              Where (path like $ObjectPattern  OR path like $ObjectPattern/%)”   
30        Else 
31  ObjectSet = “Select path From AllPaths  
                      Where (path like $Object OR path like $Object/%)”    
32        End If 
33        For each objecti in objectSet 
34                 If @Mode=’Grant’ then  
35  Insert into XAT (Subject, objecti, Predicate, Action) 
36               Else  /* Mode = ‘Deny’ */ 
37    If  there exists absolute conflict then 
38           Delete from XAT Where (XAT.Subject=Subject AND XAT.Object=objecti 
AND XAT.Action=Action) 
39                Else  
40                   If there exists partial conflict then 
41        Update XAT Set XAT.Predicate=newPredicate Where (XAT.Subject=Subject 
AND XAT.Object=objecti AND XAT.Action=Action) 
42                       End If 
43    End If 
44               End If 
45        End For 
46     End If 
47 End For 
48 End 
The first set of XAR rules given against the department data 
set are described in the XML document Authorization1.xml 
which is shown in Figure 4. 
<!ELEMENT department (deptname, gradstudent* , staff*, faculty*, undergradstudent*)> 
<!ELEMENT gradstudent (name, phone, email, address, office?, url?, gpa)> 
<!ELEMENT staff (name, phone, email, office?)> 
<!ELEMENT faculty (name, phone, email, office)> 
<!ELEMENT undergradstudent (name, phone, email, address, gpa)> 
<!ELEMENT name (lastname?,firstname)> 
<!ELEMENT address (city, state, zip)> 
<!ELEMENT deptname (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT city (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT state (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT zip (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT office (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT phone (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT lastname (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT firstname (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT url (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT gpa (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT email (#PCDATA)> 
Figure 3. DTD of department data set 
Our XAR2RAR algorithm translates XML access control 
rules into relational tuple(s) in XAT table and deals with 
authorization conflicts as it parses XML authorization 
documents. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<rules> 
          <rule> 
 <subject>staff</subject> 
 <object>//gpa></object>  
 <action>Select</action> 
 <type>L</type> 
 <mode>Grant</mode> 
           </rule>  
           <rule> 
 <subject>staff</subject> 
 <object>/department/undergradstudent/address</object> 
 <action>Select</action> 
 <type>R</type> 
 <mode>Grant</mode> 
           </rule> 
           <rule> 
 <subject>staff</subject> 
 <object>//gradstudent//zip[.<60000]</object> 
 <action>Select</action> 
 <type>L</type> 
 <mode>Grant</mode> 
           </rule> 
           <rule> 
 <subject>faculty</subject> 
 <object>/department/undergradstudent/address</object> 
 <action>Select</action> 
 <type>R</type> 
 <mode>Grant</mode> 
            </rule> 
           <rule> 
 <subject>faculty</subject> 
 <object>//gradstudent//zip[.<70000]</object> 
 <action>Select</action> 
 <type>L</type> 
 <mode>Grant</mode> 
            </rule> 
</rules> 
Figure 4. Authorization1.xml document 
When the first XAR rule is parsed, the object’s path 
expression //gpa is extended to its corresponding path 
expressions. Then, two RAR tuples with the below objects are 
inserted into XAT table to grant select access to all gpa nodes 
for staff. 
 /department/gradstudent/gpa 
 /department/undergradstudent/gpa 
When the second XAR rule is parsed, firstly, the below 
expanded path expressions of 
/department/undergradstudent/address are extracted from 
AllPaths table: 
 /department/undergradstudent/address 
 /department/undergradstudent/address/city 
 /department/undergradstudent/address/state 
 /department/undergradstudent/address/zip 
Then, four RAR tuples with the above objects are inserted 
into XAT table which grant select access to all address 
subtrees of undergraduate students for staff. 
The third XAR rule shows an example of a conditional 
authorization rule. The following target object path is granted 
access for staff subjects for zip codes less than 60000. 
 /department/gradstudent/address/zip[.<60000] 
The fourth and fifth rules are processed similar to the second 
and third rules except they are defined for faculty subjects. 
The XAT table populated by the XAR2RAR algorithm for the 
above Authorization1.xml document is given in Table I. 
TABLE I. XAT TABLE AFTER AUTHORIZATION1.XML PARSED 
XAT Table 
Subject Object Predicate Action 
staff /department/gradstudent/gpa - Select 
staff /department/undergradstudent/gpa - Select 
staff /department/undergradstudent/address - Select 
staff /department/undergradstudent/address/city - Select 
staff /department/undergradstudent/address/state - Select 
staff /department/undergradstudent/address/zip - Select 
staff /department/gradstudent/address/zip . < 60000 Select 
faculty /department/undergradstudent/address - Select 
faculty /department/undergradstudent/address/city - Select 
faculty /department/undergradstudent/address/state - Select 
faculty /department/undergradstudent/address/zip - Select 
faculty /department/gradstudent/address/zip . < 70000 Select 
The Authorization2.xml document given in Figure 5 includes 
additional set of authorization rules which conflict with the 
ones introduced in Authorization1.xml shown in Figure 4. 
First rule in Authorization2.xml denies access to subtrees of 
address nodes of undergraduate students for staff. Since we 
have grant rules defined for the same target objects, this raises 
absolute conflicts and all of the four tuples corresponding to 
those objects are deleted from the XAT table. 
The second rule denies access to zip codes of graduate 
students if the zip code is less than 70000 for staff. The XAT 
table includes grant rule on zip code for staff subjects if the 
graduate student’s zip code is less than 60000. Since 
(zip<60000)  (zip<70000), this situation raises an absolute 
conflict and the corresponding tuple is deleted from the XAT 
table.  
The third rule in Authorization2.xml denies access to GPA 
nodes which are less than 2.0 for staff. This rule conflicts with 
the RAR grant rule for GPA nodes. However the grant rule is 
unconditional and the deny rule is conditional. Since 
(GPA<2.0)  U, this situation raises a partial conflict. Thus, 
we do not delete the corresponding grant tuples in XAT table 
but update them with the new predicate (GPA >= 2.0). 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<rules> 
             <rule> 
 <subject>staff</subject> 
 <object>//undergradstudent//address</object>  
 <action>Select</action> 
 <type>R</type> 
 <mode>Deny</mode> 
              </rule>  
             <rule> 
 <subject>staff</subject> 
 <object>//gradstudent//zip[.<70000]</object>  
 <action>Select</action> 
 <type>L</type> 
 <mode>Deny</mode> 
              </rule>  
              <rule> 
 <subject>staff</subject> 
 <object>//gpa[.<2.0]></object> 
 <action>Select</action> 
 <type>L</type> 
 <mode>Deny</mode> 
              </rule> 
             <rule> 
 <subject>faculty</subject> 
 <object>//gradstudent//zip[.>60000]</object>  
 <action>Select</action> 
 <type>L</type> 
 <mode>Deny</mode> 
              </rule>  
</rules> 
Figure 5. Authorization2.xml document 
The last rule in Authorization2.xml denies access to zip codes 
of graduate students if the zip code is greater than 60000 for 
faculty subjects. The XAT table includes grant rule for faculty 
subjects if the graduate student’s zip code is less than 70000. 
Since (zip>60000)  (zip<70000) ≠ and differences are not 
empty set either, this situation raises a partial conflict and the 
corresponding RAR tuple in XAT table is updated with the 
revised predicate (zip <= 60000). 
The XAT table populated by the XAR2RAR algorithm after 
the Authorization2.xml parsed is shown in Table II. 
TABLE II XAT TABLE AFTER AUTHORIZATION2.XML PARSED 
XAT Table 
Subject Object Predicate Action 
staff /department/gradstudent/gpa .>= 2.0 Select 
staff /department/undergradstudent/gpa .>= 2.0 Select 
faculty /department/gradstudent/address - Select 
faculty /department/gradstudent/address/city - Select 
faculty /department/gradstudent/address/state - Select 
faculty /department/gradstudent/address/zip - Select 
faculty /department/undergradstudent/address/zip .<= 60000 Select 
XAT table is central in the process of secure translation of 
XML queries into SQL queries in our relational XML 
database system. First, an input XML query is mapped into an 
SQL query. Then it is rewritten based on the security 
information obtained from the XAT table. The rewritten 
secure query returns the permitted query results. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
We proposed a fine-grained access control model with 
conflict handling mechanisms in the presence of conditions 
for relational XML databases. We define the concepts of 
absolute conflicts and partial conflicts which are instrumental 
in evaluating and resolving authorization conflicts.  
Our proposed algorithm XAR2RAR translates XML 
authorization rules (XAR) into relational authorization rules 
(RAR) and stores them in a relational table. XAR2RAR 
algorithm resolves conflicts due to conditions effectively and 
deals with overall authorization conflicts elegantly using a 
centralized authorization table (XAT) in the target relational 
database. 
We introduced conflicts due to grant-deny authorization 
policies defined on common objects. We did not look into 
grant-grant or deny-deny conflicts. In case of partial conflicts, 
the underlying RAR rule needs to be updated with a relevant 
new predicate. The new predicate is produced differently for 
various situations. We consider elaborating other types of 
authorization conflicts and introducing a new predicate 
production algorithm for different cases of partial conflicts as 
potential future work. 
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